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SUPER PAC CONTRIBUTIONS, 
CORRUPTION, AND THE PROXY 
WAR OVER COORDINATION 
RICHARD L. HASEN 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1995, journalist and supply-side economics enthusiast Jude 
Wanniski wrote an op-ed in the New York Times noting an anomaly: 
Under the Supreme Court’s campaign finance rulings,1 billionaire 
Steve Forbes could spend $25 million (or any amount) to support his 
own candidacy to be president, but he could donate only $1000 to 
Jack Kemp’s presidential campaign.2 Forbes believed that Kemp 
would have been a more effective candidate to promote Forbes’s 
views, and Wanniski suggested that Forbes should have been able to 
give $25 million directly to Kemp to bankroll a Kemp candidacy.3 
Wanniski saw nothing wrong with Forbes giving Kemp so much 
money: “Wouldn’t we expect President Kemp, with his $25 million 
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 1.  The modern era begins with Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). On Buckley’s key 
holdings, see RICHARD L. HASEN, LEGISLATION, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, AND 
ELECTION LAW: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS ch. 13 (forthcoming 2014); DANIEL HAYS 
LOWENSTEIN, RICHARD L. HASEN & DANIEL P. TOKAJI, ELECTION LAW—CASES AND 
MATERIALS ch. 14 (5th ed. 2012). 
 2.  Jude Wanniski, Bowing for Dollars, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1995, at A31. For my 
response, see Richard L. Hasen, Letter to the Editor, Let’s Not Auction Off Political Access, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1995, at A20, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1995/10/04/opinion/l-let-s-
not-auction-off-political-access-037320.html.   
 3.  Wanniski, supra note 2. Wanniski further explained:  
Why is . . . Steve Forbes leaving the comfort of his publishing empire for the rough-
and-tumble of Presidential politics? Because his idol, Jack Kemp, decided he did not 
have the stomach to raise $25 million at $1,000 a pop, . . . [which] would require him to 
make a thousand promises he . . . could not keep. On CNN’s ‘Capital Gang’ recently, 
Mr. Kemp acknowledged that he would be running if Mr. Forbes could supply $25 
million. On CNN’s ‘Evans and Novak’ earlier the same day, Mr. Forbes acknowledged 
that he would not be running if Mr. Kemp were in the race.  
Id. 
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check from Mr. Forbes, to take a call from him sooner than from, say, 
Mr. Business Week? But so what? His views are closer to Forbes’s 
than to Business Week’s, with or without campaign contributions.”4 
Wanniski’s views appear to be in the minority, at least judged by 
longstanding laws imposing individual contribution limitations in 
federal elections and in many state and local elections. The 2002 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA, more commonly known as 
McCain-Feingold) doubled the very modest $1000 individual 
contribution limitation from the 1974 Federal Election Campaign Act 
Amendments to $2000 and indexed the limits to inflation;5 in the 2014 
election season the limit is $2600 per election, meaning a person can 
give a congressional candidate $5200 (once for the primary and once 
for the general election).6 That individual limit nonetheless still allows 
amply funded federal campaigns. In the 2012 election, for example, 
Democratic candidate Barack Obama and Republican candidate Mitt 
Romney (along with affiliated party committees) each raised above 
$1 billion.7 Candidates are raising a lot of money in contributions of 
$5200 or less. 
Today, however, millions of dollars also are flowing into outside 
groups (including groups now dubbed “Super PACs”) that support 
presidential candidates much in the same way that Wanniski wanted 
Forbes to be able to support Kemp. I argue in this Article that these 
Super PAC contributions raise virtually the same risks as large 
contributions directly to candidates, that the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence does not allow for regulating contributions to outside 
groups in the same way that it allows for regulation of direct 
contributions to candidates, that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence is 
wrong, and that we cannot get around the problem by redefining the 
technical definition of coordination to treat Super PAC contributions 
like contributions to a candidate. 
 
 
 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C.A. § 441a(a)(1)(A) (West 2014). 
 6.  FED. ELECTION COMM’N, CONTRIBUTION LIMITS 2013-2014, available at http://fec.gov/ 
pages/brochures/contriblimitschart.htm.  
 7.  HASEN, supra note 1, ch. 16; Presidential Campaign, National Party, and Joint 
Committee Fundraising Through December 31, 2012, CAMPAIGN FINANCE INSTITUTE, 
http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/federal/president/2012/Presidential%20Fundraising%20byCommittee
_2012.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2014); see FED. ELECTION COMM’N, supra note 6 (indicating that 
contributions to state and national political parties are subject to higher individual limits). 
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I start in Part I with the case against unlimited contributions 
directly to candidates and explain that virtually the same case applies 
against unlimited contributions to a reliable Super PAC—a single-
candidate Super PAC that can be expected to further a candidate’s 
campaign. In Part II, I explain how the Supreme Court’s new narrow 
definition of corruption forecloses arguments for limiting 
contributions to these reliable Super PACs directly. Finally, in Part III, 
I argue that the attempt to regulate Super PAC contributions through 
enhanced “coordination” rules is likely to fail. The problem is with the 
Supreme Court’s definition of corruption, and it cannot be solved 
through better drafting of coordination or other rules. 
I.  WHY LIMIT SUPER PAC CONTRIBUTIONS? 
Consider four reasons why people may favor contribution limits 
and oppose Wanniski’s suggestion to allow an individual to give a 
candidate for public office $25 million or more. First, individual 
contribution limits deter bribery and extortion (the antibribery 
interest). Though I believe that Jack Kemp would not have been 
bribable even for $25 million, and that Forbes would not have been 
attempting a bribe even if he gave Kemp $25 million, there are many 
unscrupulous politicians who could be bribed for much less. For 
example, a New York State Assembly Member was recently convicted 
for accepting a mere $22,000 bribe in exchange for taking favorable 
actions related to an adult day care center.8 Bribery is already very 
difficult to detect because people who are bribed want to keep it a 
secret. But bribery would be even easier if very large campaign 
contributions were legal. As things stand now, unscrupulous 
individuals wanting to engage in a bribery transaction need to hide 
both the agreement and the payments. If unlimited contributions were 
allowed, the only thing that conspirators would need to hide is the 
agreement: “I will give you $25 million and in exchange you will 
support legislation for a tax break that will save me $1 billion.” By 
keeping individual contributions limits low, there is not enough 
money at stake in campaign contributions for a politician to be 
bought, and unscrupulous individuals need to take steps to hide 
money that cannot be provided through a campaign contribution. 
 
 8.  John Herzfeld, Jury Convicts N.Y. State Legislator on Charges of Trading Favors for 
Bribes, BLOOMBERG BNA MONEY & POLITICS REPORT (Jan. 15, 2014), 
http://news.bna.com/mpdm/MPDMWB/split_display.adp?fedfid=39901945&vname=mpebulallis
sues&fn=39901945&jd=39901945.  
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Relatedly, politicians cannot demand $25 million in exchange for not 
retaliating against would-be wealthy donors because there is no way 
the potential donor could directly give that money. 
Second, individual contribution limits prevent undue influence 
and conflicts of interest (the anti-undue influence interest). Some 
supporters of limits worry not just about outright bribery, but also 
that, thanks to human nature and feelings of reciprocity, candidates 
who receive extremely large contributions will feel grateful to large 
donors and will take legislative and other steps to favor the donors. 
This happens not through any quid pro quo exchange but instead 
through norms of reciprocity. The human mind being as it is, it is quite 
easy for people to rationalize taking actions consistent with their own 
self-interest. As Dan Lowenstein observed long ago, candidates who 
can take very large campaign contributions from those who have 
business before the candidate have an inherent conflict of interest.9 At 
the very least, large contributions can buy access, giving the large 
donor much more influence over an elected official’s thinking and 
agenda than the typical voter. 
Third, individual contribution limits promote political equality by 
limiting both the sale of access and disproportionate influence over 
election outcomes (the equality interest). Wanniski pooh-poohed the 
objection that Kemp would take Forbes’s phone calls, reasoning that 
Kemp would have done that without the contribution and that, 
because Kemp’s ideology lined up with Forbes’s ideology, the extra 
access would make no difference in policy.10 That may well be true of 
the Kemp-Forbes relationship, but it may not be true for many large 
donors. To use the earlier example, a donor might give $25 million to a 
candidate not because the donor agrees with the candidate’s ideology, 
but because the donor hopes it will give the candidate the opportunity 
to make a pitch for a $1 billion tax cut. To some, this access is unfair 
because only the large donor gets to make the pitch for the tax cut 
while those on the other side or with other interests are much less 
likely to get the same access. Further, there is a separate equality 
concern: The $25 million contribution could make it more likely that 
the candidate gets elected, and that means that the large donor has a 
bigger say over the outcome of the election than others who feel just 
as passionately but lack the same funds to support the candidates of 
 
 9.  Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of All Evil is 
Deeply Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 301, 323–29 (1989). 
 10.  Wanniski, supra note 2. 
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their choice. 
Fourth, individual contribution limits could promote public 
confidence in the electoral process by reducing the appearance of 
corruption or the appearance of inequality (the public confidence 
interest). If the public believes that large donors are bribing 
candidates, large donors have undue influence over 
candidates/elected officials, large donors have unfair access to 
candidates/elected officials, or large donors have disproportionate 
influence over the outcome of elections, the public could lose 
confidence in the fairness of the electoral process. 
Opponents of strong campaign regulation contest these points on 
empirical grounds, normative grounds, or both. Although virtually no 
one supports bribery of elected officials, some contend that outright 
bribery is rare, based on the number of prosecutions, and that bribery 
would not rise appreciably with very large legal campaign 
contributions.11 Even though campaign contributions are valuable to 
candidates, they may not be nearly as valuable to unscrupulous 
politicians as piles of cash in the freezer12 or a new yacht.13 
Some believe undue influence or the sale of access should not 
count as corruption, and that all the law should do is prevent actual 
quid pro quo corruption or the appearance of quid pro quo 
corruption.14 Some reject political equality as a legitimate reason for 
limiting campaign contributions,15 and note that empirical evidence 
casts serious doubts on any relationship between campaign finance 
laws and public confidence in the government or the electoral 
 
 11.  See Stephen A. Ansolabehere, The Scope of Corruption: Lessons from Comparative 
Campaign Finance Disclosure, 6 ELECTION L.J. 163, 175 (2006). 
 12.  Jerry Markon, Ex-Rep. Jefferson Gets 13 Years in Freezer Cash Case, WASH. POST 
(Nov. 14, 2009), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2009-11-14/news/36786791_1_william-j-
jefferson-prison-term-robert-p-trout. 
 13.  Bill Chappell, Former Rep. ‘Duke’ Cunningham Freed After Bribery Conviction, NPR 
NEWS (Jun. 4, 2013, 2:45 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2013/06/04/188667106/ 
former-rep-duke-cunningham-freed-after-bribery-sentence. But it is important not to 
underestimate how much personal value candidates and elected officials can still get out of 
campaign contributions, including by taking  luxury vacations with lobbyists and fundraisers. See 
Eric Lipton, A Loophole Allows Lawmakers to Reel in Trips and Donations, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
19, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/20/us/politics/a-loophole-allows-lawmakers-to-reel-
in-trips-and-donations.html (explaining how a statutory loophole allows lobbyists to mask 
contributions).  
 14.  See, e.g., Bradley A. Smith, Super PACs and the Role of “Coordination” in Campaign 
Finance Law, 49 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 603, 615 (2013). 
 15.  See, e.g., BRADLEY A. SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH 195–96 (2003). 
HASEN 4.26.2014 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/28/2014  1:04 PM 
6 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 9:1 
process.16 Admittedly, the relationship between money spent on 
elections and electoral outcomes is complicated; therefore it is 
difficult to define the proper scope of necessary regulation.17  
I will return to these objections and related constitutional issues 
shortly, but first I want to contrast Wanniski’s Forbes-Kemp scenario 
with two other relationships involving rich donors and presidential 
candidates. In 2004, liberal financier George Soros wanted to help 
defeat Republican President George W. Bush, who was running for 
reelection.18 Soros could give only a few thousand dollars directly to 
the campaign of Democrat John Kerry. But Soros gave approximately 
$27 million to other organizations that promoted Kerry’s candidacy.19 
At the time, federal law provided that an individual could not give 
more than $5000 to a political committee supporting candidates for 
federal office. But Soros gave millions to the “non-federal fund” 
(ostensibly not subject to the $5000 limit) of Americans Coming 
Together (ACT),20 a political organization organized under section 
527 of the tax code. ACT claimed that even though it was running ads 
attacking Bush and supporting Kerry and others, and even though it 
was headed by Kerry’s former campaign manager, it could pay for 
those ads mostly out of its non-federal fund and therefore was not 
bound by the $5000 individual contribution limitation. There was no 
evidence the group coordinated with Kerry’s campaign, but ACT did 
mimic the campaign’s advertising strategy. A few years after the 
election, the Federal Election Commission (FEC) determined that 
ACT violated pre-Citizens United campaign finance law, imposed a 
$775,000 fine, and decided ACT should have paid more from its 
federal political account (to be used for federal election activity and 
subject to the contribution limits applicable to federal  political action 
committees) because its major purpose was to elect a federal 
candidate.21 In particular, ACT should not have accepted 
 
 16.  Nathaniel Persily & Kelli Lammie, Perceptions of Corruption and Campaign Finance: 
When Public Opinion Determines Constitutional Law, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 119, 119–20 (2004).  
 17.  For a summary, see LOWENSTEIN, HASEN & TOKAJI, supra note 1, at 676–80. 
 18.  Thomas B. Edsall, Soros-Backed Activist Group Disbands as Interest Fades, WASH. 
POST (Aug. 3, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/02/ 
AR2005080201849.html. 
 19.  George Soros, Maintaining Political Interest, NPR NEWS (June 10, 2006, 8:00 AM), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5476317.  
 20.  Edsall, supra note 18 (“Soros and his close associate . . . together put $38.5 million into 
ACT and the Media Fund. With this seed money, the two organizations collected $196.4 million, 
enough to . . . flood the airwaves with pro-Democratic commercials in the early spring of 2004 
when Kerry’s campaign was broke.”). 
 21.  FED. ELECTION COMM’N, CONCILIATION AGREEMENT IN THE MATTER OF AMERICA 
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contributions exceeding $5000 from individuals to pay for these ads.22 
Those with serious concerns about Soros giving $27 million 
directly to Kerry should have similar concerns about Soros giving the 
same amount to independent groups with close personal ties to Kerry. 
Again, though I have no reason to doubt the honesty of Kerry and 
Soros, unscrupulous donors and candidates could agree to a bribe, 
with the money going to a group committed to doing everything to 
elect the candidate. That committee need not even know about the 
bribe; it is certainly not required that there be “bargaining 
opportunities” involving the outside group.23 The other interests noted 
for limiting contributions to candidates are in play as well: A large 
donor to an independent group could well have undue influence over 
the candidate, even if the financial support is marginally attenuated; 
the large donor to the independent group is likely to get special access 
to the candidate and the large contribution could have an outsized 
influence on the election campaign; and the public’s confidence could 
be shaken by a large contribution to an independent group with close 
ties to the candidate. All of these arguments are somewhat lessened 
by the independence of the outside group, but they are still present. 
The second scenario concerns the 2012 presidential election, and 
the campaign contributions of conservative casino magnate Sheldon 
Adelson. By the time of the 2012 election, court decisions had begun 
to transform the campaign finance landscape in favor of major 
donors: The Supreme Court had decided Citizens United v. FEC,24 
allowing independent corporate spending in elections, and the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit had 
decided SpeechNow.Org v. FEC,25 allowing individuals to give 
unlimited sums to political committees that make only independent 
expenditures supporting or opposing candidates. On the regulatory 
front, the FEC had issued two advisory opinions allowing corporate 
and labor union contributions to these independent expenditure-only 
 
COMING TOGETHER 1 (2007), available at http://eqs.fec.gov/eqsdocs/000061A1.pdf. 
 22.  FEC to Collect $775,000 Civil Penalty from Americans Coming Together, FED. 
ELECTION COMM’N (Aug. 29, 2007), http://www.fec.gov/press/press2007/20070829act.shtml; 
Kenneth P. Vogel, Soros-Linked Group Hit with Huge Fine, POLITICO (Aug. 29, 2007, 5:51 PM), 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0807/5555.html. ACT did not admit wrongdoing in 
agreeing to settle the case. FED. ELECTION COMM’N, supra note 21. 
 23.  Cf. Smith, supra note 14, at 632 (“No bargaining opportunities arise unless [the Super 
PAC employee] has contact with the campaign or candidate post-Super PAC employment.”). 
 24.  558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010). 
 25.  599 F.3d 686, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
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committees,26 which became known as Super PACs. In the 2012 
elections, all of the serious presidential candidates had single-
candidate Super PACs supporting them, with many headed by friends 
or former campaign associates.27 Some Super PACs even took 
campaign contributions from the candidate’s family members.28 In 
essence, these Super PACs were the legal version of what ACT was 
trying to do back in 2004. 
Adelson gave unprecedented sums to Super PACs—first $20 
million to Winning Our Future, the Super PAC supporting Republican 
Newt Gingrich in the Republican primaries, and then $30 million to 
Restore Our Future, the Super PAC supporting Mitt Romney’s 
general election campaign against President Obama.29 Restore Our 
Future was headed by Charlie Spies, a close associate of Mitt 
Romney.30 There was no evidence Restore Our Future violated the 
rules on coordinating with the Romney campaign. But, consistent 
with FEC rulings, Romney was allowed to solicit funds (of no more 
than $5000) for the independent group.31 (President Obama 
apparently did the same thing, soliciting funds for Priorities USA, a 
pro-Obama Super PAC headed by Bill Burton, a former close 
associate of Obama.32) Restore Our Future complemented the 
Romney campaign’s strategy, and generally mimicked the campaign’s 
 
 26.  Club for Growth, Inc., FEC Adv. Op. 2010-09 (July 22, 2010), http://saos.fec.gov/ 
aodocs/AO%202010-09.pdf; Commonsense Ten, FEC Adv. Op. 2010-11 (July 22, 2010), 
http://saos.fec.gov/aodocs/AO2010-11.pdf.  
 27.  See Nicholas Confessore & Michael Luo, G.O.P. Donors Show Thirst to Oust Obama 
in November, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/01/us/politics/ 
campaign-finance-reports-show-super-pac-donors.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; Dan Eggen, The 
Influence Industry: ‘Candidate Super PACs’ Surge Ahead in 2012 Money Race, WASH. POST 
(Aug. 24, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/the-influence-industry-candidate-
super-pacs-surge-ahead-in-the-2012-money-race/2011/08/24/gIQAm5qBcJ_story.html.  
 28.  See, e.g., Nicholas Confessore, Huntsman’s Father Gave $1.9 Million to Super PAC, 
N.Y. TIMES CAUCUS BLOG (Jan. 31, 2012, 11:44 AM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes. 
com/2012/01/31/huntsman-sr-gave-1-9-million-to-pro-huntsman-super-pac/.  
 29.  Theodoric Meyer, How Much Did Sheldon Adelson Really Spend on Campaign 2012?, 
PROPUBLICA (Dec. 20, 2012), http://www.propublica.org/article/how-much-did-sheldon-
adelson-really-spend-on-campaign-2012. 
 30.  Restore Our Future, FACTCHECK.ORG (July 25, 2012), http://www.factcheck.org/ 
2011/09/restore-our-future/.  
 31.  Ryan J. Reilly, FEC: Politicians Can Solicit Donations for ‘Super PACs,’ But Only up 
to 5K, TALKING POINTS MEMO (June 30, 2011, 8:05 PM), http://talkingpointsmemo.com/ 
muckraker/fec-politicians-can-solicit-donations-for-super-pacs-but-only-up-to-5k.  
 32.  Priorities U.S.A./Priorities USA Action, FACTCHECK.ORG (Aug. 6, 2012), 
http://www.factcheck.org/2011/09/priorities-usapriorities-usa-action/; Amanda Terkel & Sam 
Stein, Obama Broke Super PAC Pledge During Campaign, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 4, 2013), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/04/obama-super-pac_n_4214466.html.  
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message.33 Adelson’s contributions to Restore Our Future and 
Winning Our Future were part of the $98 million to $150 million (or 
more) that Adelson and his wife contributed in the 2012 elections34—
making Wanniski’s plea for $25 million to Kemp in 1996 seem quaint. 
As with the Soros-Kerry connection, the Adelson-Romney 
connection raised concerns similar to those that would have been 
raised had Adelson made a multi-million dollar contribution directly 
to Romney. To repeat, though I have no reason to doubt the honesty 
of Romney and Adelson, unscrupulous donors and candidates could 
agree to a bribe with the money going to a group committed to doing 
everything to elect the candidate. Once again, there need be no 
bargaining involving the Super PAC directly. The anti-undue 
influence, political equality, and public confidence arguments are the 
same as in Soros-Kerry. The independence of the Super PAC may 
somewhat alleviate, but does not eliminate, those concerns. 
One additional concern about undue influence arises from Super 
PACs that does not arise from direct contributions to candidates (at 
least in a world where individual contributions are limited): A wealthy 
individual or entity could threaten to bankroll a large Super PAC 
working against an elected official up for reelection in the event that 
official acts inconsistently with the wealthy individual or entity’s 
interests.35 Even without an explicit threat or quid pro quo, an elected 
official could be influenced out of fear that the wealthy individuals or 
entities will bankroll her opposition. This threat is much more 
credible when the individual or entity can give unlimited 
contributions to a Super PAC, as opposed to simply giving the 
maximum individual contribution amount to an opposing candidate. 
These three examples demonstrate that the case for contribution 
limits to individual candidates resembles the case for contribution 
limits to independent groups, or at least to groups that are closely 
aligned with the candidates. Though some small differences remain 
 
 33.  In fact, at one point during the 2012 campaign, Restore Our Future ran the same ad, 
word for word, as Romney himself ran in the 2008 presidential election. Domenico Montanaro, 
Pro Romney Super PAC Recycles Romney 2007 Ad, NBC NEWS (Feb. 23, 2012), 
http://firstread.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/02/23/10488670-pro-romney-super-pac-recycles-2007-
romney-campaign-ad?lite.  
 34.  Meyer, supra note 29. As Meyer explains, certain groups, such as those organized 
under section 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code, need not publicly disclose details 
regarding the contributions they receive. Id. 
 35.  Richard L. Hasen, The Biggest Danger of Super PACs, CNN OPINION (Jan. 9, 2012), 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/09/opinion/hasen-super-pacs/index.html.  
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between contributing directly to the candidate and giving to a 
supportive Super PAC, in general, the concerns about large 
contributions are parallel. If one believes it is desirable to limit 
contributions directly to candidates, one should favor limits on 
contributions to single-candidate Super PACs as well. 
II.  SUPER PAC CONTRIBUTION LIMITS AND THE FIGHT OVER 
“CORRUPTION” 
In Part I, I listed four different interests that could justify 
individual contribution limitations applied directly to candidates as 
well as to single-issue reliable Super PACs supporting candidates: the 
antibribery interest, the anti-undue influence interest, the political 
equality interest, and the public confidence interest. Whether these 
interests or others motivate those who support contribution interests, 
and the relative importance of each interest, is hard to say. 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has limited the types of interests that 
may be weighed against the First Amendment rights of those who 
contribute and want to accept contributions.36 The Court also has 
required application of “exacting scrutiny” as the balancing test for 
judging the constitutionality of contribution limits.37 Thus, only some 
arguments to sustain individual contribution limits will pass judicial 
muster. 
To sum up the matter briefly,38 the Supreme Court has accepted 
only the interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of 
corruption to justify contribution limitations to candidates—although 
the definition of “corruption” has shifted over time.39 Under an 
exacting scrutiny standard, the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld 
contribution limitations applied in candidate elections, except in one 
instance when the Court held a limit was so low as to prevent a 
candidate from being able to engage in effective advocacy.40 
 
 
 
 36.  See HASEN, supra note 1, chs. 14–15.   
 37.   Id. 
 38.  For more detailed analysis, see id.; LOWENSTEIN, HASEN & TOKAJI, supra note 1, chs. 
12–14. 
 39.  For a clear and useful taxonomy, see Yasmin Dawood, Classifying Corruption, 9 DUKE 
J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2014). 
 40.  Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 262 (2006); see generally Richard L. Hasen, The Newer 
Incoherence: Competition, Social Science, and Balancing in Campaign Finance Law After 
Randall v. Sorrell, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 849 (2007). 
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The Supreme Court has not directly weighed the constitutionality 
of contribution limits to independent groups such as Super PACs.41 
However, in the context of spending limits, to which the Supreme 
Court has applied strict scrutiny, Citizens United held that spending by 
independent groups cannot corrupt or create the appearance of 
corruption.42 Thereafter, the D.C. Circuit in SpeechNow held that if 
 
 41.  Before Citizens United, there was some question whether the Court in a 1981 case, Cal. 
Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182 (1981), had endorsed limitations on campaign contributions to 
independent expenditure committees and then reaffirmed the constitutionality of limits in 
McConnell v. FEC in its footnote 48. See Richard L. Hasen, Buckley is Dead, Long Live 
Buckley: The New Campaign Finance Incoherence of McConnell v. Federal Election 
Commission, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 31, 69 (2004). 
 42.  Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359–61 (2010). Here is the key portion of that 
analysis: 
When Buckley identified a sufficiently important governmental interest in preventing 
corruption or the appearance of corruption, that interest was limited to quid pro quo 
corruption. The fact that speakers may have influence over or access to elected 
officials does not mean that these officials are corrupt: 
Favoritism and influence are not . . . avoidable in representative politics. It is 
in the nature of an elected representative to favor certain policies, and, by 
necessary corollary, to favor the voters and contributors who support those 
policies. It is well understood that a substantial and legitimate reason, if not 
the only reason, to cast a vote for, or to make a contribution to, one 
candidate over another is that the candidate will respond by producing those 
political outcomes the supporter favors. Democracy is premised on 
responsiveness. [McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 297 (2003) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part)]. 
Reliance on a “generic favoritism or influence theory . . . is at odds with standard First 
Amendment analyses because it is unbounded and susceptible to no limiting 
principle.”  
 
The appearance of influence or access, furthermore, will not cause the electorate to 
lose faith in our democracy. By definition, an independent expenditure is political 
speech presented to the electorate that is not coordinated with a candidate. The fact 
that a corporation, or any other speaker, is willing to spend money to try to persuade 
voters presupposes that the people have the ultimate influence over elected officials. 
This is inconsistent with any suggestion that the electorate will refuse to take part in 
democratic governance because of additional political speech made by a corporation 
or any other speaker. . . . 
 
The McConnell record was “over 100,000 pages” long, yet it “does not have any direct 
examples of votes being exchanged for . . . expenditures.” This confirms Buckley’s 
reasoning that independent expenditures do not lead to, or create the appearance of, 
quid pro quo corruption. In fact, there is only scant evidence that independent 
expenditures even ingratiate. Ingratiation and access, in any event, are not corruption. 
The BCRA record establishes that certain donations to political parties, called “soft 
money,” were made to gain access to elected officials. This case, however, is about 
independent expenditures, not soft money. When Congress finds that a problem 
exists, we must give that finding due deference; but Congress may not choose an 
unconstitutional remedy. If elected officials succumb to improper influences from 
independent expenditures; if they surrender their best judgment; and if they put 
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independent spending cannot corrupt, then contributions to fund 
independent spending cannot corrupt either.43 How can we square this 
analysis with the analysis in Part I, which showed that similar interests 
support individual contribution limits and limits on contributions to 
Super PACs and other independent groups? Why reach divergent 
constitutional outcomes in the two cases? 
To begin with, we can take the third interest, political equality, off 
the table. Even if equalization does motivate supporters of 
contribution limitations, the Court in Buckley v. Valeo,44 FEC v. 
Davis,45 and Citizens United has rejected the interest.46 The rejection is 
all the clearer after Citizens United overturned cases obliquely 
embracing a political equality rationale in the context of corporate 
spending and labor union spending.47 Indeed, following the Court’s 
recent opinion in Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom PAC v. 
Bennett,48 striking down the matching funds portion of Arizona’s 
public financing law, if political equality is even part of a law’s 
motivation, the law may violate the First Amendment.49 
As to the three other interests—antibribery, anti-undue influence, 
and public confidence—the Court’s treatment of contribution and 
spending limits has diverged for empirical and conceptual reasons. 
Admittedly, the Supreme Court has said that the prevention of 
corruption or the appearance of corruption can justify contribution 
limits. But the problem becomes what the Court means by 
“corruption,” a concept that has shifted over time.50 Empirically, 
 
expediency before principle, then surely there is cause for concern. We must give 
weight to attempts by Congress to seek to dispel either the appearance or the reality 
of these influences. The remedies enacted by law, however, must comply with the First 
Amendment; and, it is our law and our tradition that more speech, not less, is the 
governing rule. An outright ban on corporate political speech during the critical 
preelection period is not a permissible remedy. Here Congress has created categorical 
bans on speech that are asymmetrical to preventing quid pro quo corruption. 
Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 43.  SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 44.  424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 45.  554 U.S. 724 (2008). 
 46.  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 379–84 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); Davis, 554 U.S. 724, 
741–42; Buckley, 424 U.S. 48–49. 
 47.  See generally Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 
MICH. L. REV. 581 (2011) (explaining the change in the doctrine). 
 48.  131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011). 
 49.  Id. at 2825–26; see also id. at 2843–44 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“This Court, after all, has 
never said that a law restricting speech (or any other constitutional right) demands two 
compelling interests. One is enough. And this statute has one: preventing corruption. So it does 
not matter that equalizing campaign speech is an insufficient interest.”). 
 50.  See HASEN, supra note 1, chs. 13–14 (summarizing the shifts in the doctrine).  
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Citizens United appears to establish—as an uncontestable fact—that 
independent spending cannot corrupt or create the appearance of 
corruption. 
I have been quite critical of this determination, because it does not 
allow factfinders to consider a contrary conclusion based upon actual 
evidence.51 As Part I demonstrated, the potential for quid pro quo 
bribery appears nearly as strong when it comes to large contributions 
flowing to a reliable single-candidate Super PAC—understood as one 
staffed by close associates of the candidate and backed by the 
candidate’s friends and family—as with contributions flowing to the 
candidate directly. When the Super PAC is reliable, the money is just 
as valuable as in the campaign coffers (except for those candidates 
who would use the money in the coffers for personal, not political, 
benefits). 
Citizens United appears to exclude the possible bribery role of 
contributions to reliable Super PACs,52 and if the Court ever considers 
the issue it could well agree with the SpeechNow.Org court that 
contributions to fund independent spending cannot cause quid pro 
quo corruption any more than independent spending can. 
The parallel empirical issue arises with respect to the fourth 
interest, the public confidence interest. As discussed in Part I, the 
potential for the public to lose confidence in our system of 
government or the electoral process appears nearly as strong when it 
comes to large contributions flowing to a reliable single-candidate 
Super PAC as with contributions flowing to the candidate directly. But 
once again, Citizens United appears to exclude the possibility of 
demonstrating that large contributions to a candidate’s reliable Super 
PAC can cause the public to lose confidence in government.53 
This leaves the second interest, the undue influence interest. 
Recall the concern here is elected officials who are too compliant 
with the interests of donors, and too willing to grant an audience to 
those donors. Indeed, in the case of potential Super PAC donors, the 
undue influence concern may be greater because elected officials may 
fear potential donors may donate not to the candidate or a supportive 
Super PAC but to an opposing Super PAC, against the candidate. This 
 
 51.  Hasen, supra note 47. 
 52.  See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 356–61 (rejecting arguments that money spent 
independent of candidates can corrupt or create the appearance of corruption). If independent 
spending can never corrupt, then contributions to fund independent spending can never corrupt. 
 53.  See id. 
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(sometimes implicit) threat could give those potential donors 
improper access, providing a strong anticorruption basis for limiting 
contributions to Super PACs. 
The problem with using undue influence as a form of corruption is 
not only empirical but also conceptual. In a series of earlier 
contributions cases, most notably Nixon v. Shrink Missouri 
Government PAC,54 the Supreme Court endorsed an undue influence 
theory of corruption, and relatedly an appearance of undue influence 
theory of corruption.55 These cases, however, are in considerable 
tension with Citizens United and the Supreme Court’s most recent 
campaign finance case, McCutcheon v. FEC.56 Although the Citizens 
United Court was careful to note that it was not deciding the 
constitutionality of contribution limits,57 it rejected these earlier cases’ 
broad theory of corruption—at least in evaluating spending limits—
by concluding that ingratiation and access are not corruption.58 If 
neither undue influence nor the appearance of undue influence are 
valid theories of corruption then it is hard to see the path toward 
sustaining contribution limits to Super PACs. 
If there was any doubt before over whether the Court’s narrow 
definition of corruption and the appearance of corruption applies to 
contribution limitations, there is no longer. As this Article went to 
press, the Supreme Court decided McCutcheon, striking down federal 
limits on the total (or “aggregate”) amount that a donor may give in a 
two-year election cycle to all candidates, federal political parties, and 
PACs that make direct contributions to candidates.59 Although a full 
analysis of this case is beyond the scope of this Article, McCutcheon 
makes three moves of doctrinal significance that make it even less 
likely that courts will accept limitations on contributions to Super 
 
 54.  528 U.S. 377 (2000). 
 55.  Id. at 382–83, 397–96; see generally Richard L. Hasen, Shrink Missouri, Campaign 
Finance, and “The Thing That Wouldn’t Leave”, 17 CONST. COMMENTARY 483 (2000); Hasen, 
supra note 35. 
 56.  134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014). 
 57.  Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010) (“Citizens United has not made 
direct contributions to candidates, and it has not suggested that the Court should reconsider 
whether contribution limits should be subjected to rigorous First Amendment scrutiny.”). 
 58.  The Court did suggest that the analysis might be different for large, soft money 
contributions: “The BCRA record establishes that certain donations to political parties, called 
‘soft money,’ were made to gain access to elected officials. This case, however, is about 
independent expenditures, not soft money.” Id. at 360. It is not clear how to reconcile this part 
of Citizens United with the rest of the opinion. 
 59.  McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1442. 
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PACs.60 
First, the Court incorporated the narrow definition of corruption 
from Citizens United into the contributions context, ignoring the 
much broader definition in Shrink Missouri.61 Second, the Court made 
a similar move reading the appearance of corruption to apply only to 
an “appearance of quid pro quo corruption,”62 severely constricting 
Buckley’s broader concern about an “appearance of improper 
influence.”63 Finally, the Court, again ignoring Shrink Missouri, 
severely ratcheted up the meaning of “exacting scrutiny” to a much 
more “rigorous” test.64 Taken as a whole, McCutcheon calls the 
constitutionality of all contribution limits into question. 
In sum, although the arguments for individual contribution limits 
applied to candidate campaign accounts and to single-candidate 
reliable Super PACs appear to be very close to each other and 
roughly similar in strength, current Supreme Court doctrine makes it 
extremely unlikely that possible arguments for contribution limits will 
be successfully applied to Super PACs. Part of the problem is 
empirical (rejection of the potential for quid pro quo corruption for 
contributions funding independent spending); part is conceptual 
(rejection of undue influence as a legitimate form of corruption); and 
part is normative (rejection of the political equality interest for 
limiting contributions). In short, it may take a change in Supreme 
Court personnel to sustain contribution limits in this area. 
III.  THE COORDINATION PROXY WAR 
Savvy campaign finance reformers understand that the Citizens 
United, McCutcheon, and SpeechNow.Org reading of the meaning of 
corruption makes it difficult under current doctrine to sustain 
contribution limitations for Super PACs and other independent 
expenditure committees. This roadblock has caused some supporters 
 
 60.  I explain these three moves in greater detail in Richard L. Hasen, Die Another Day: 
The Supreme Court Takes a Big Step Closer to Gutting the Last Bits of Campaign Finance 
Reform, SLATE (Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/ 
2014/04/the_subtle_awfulness_of_the_mccutcheon_v_fec_campaign_finance_decision_the.html. 
 61.  See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441, 1450–51. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976); see also Richard L. Hasen, Opening the 
Political Money Chutes, REUTERS (Apr. 7, 2014), http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2014/ 
04/07/opening-the-political-money-chutes/.  
 64.  See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1446 (“[I]f a law that restricts political speech does not 
‘avoid unnecessary abridgement’ of First Amendment rights, it cannot survive ‘rigorous’ 
review.” (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25)). 
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to seek an alternative route to cover such conduct: the coordination 
rules. Federal law treats coordinated expenditures as contributions,65 
and therefore if Super PACs “coordinate” their activity with 
candidates, they can no longer raise unlimited contributions. If the 
Super PAC and candidate sit down and discuss strategy, for example, 
the two entities are coordinating and the coordination rules apply. 
Unfortunately for those of us who support Super PAC contribution 
limits, the coordination route appears even less promising than the 
anticorruption argument for sustaining such limits. 
Advocates of reforming coordination rules posit that the 
overlapping personal and personnel connections between a 
candidate’s committee and a single-candidate reliable Super PAC 
justify treating contributions to the Super PAC as coordinated with 
the candidate’s committee, and therefore subject to the individual 
contribution limits. For example, the proposed American Anti-
Corruption Act (AACA),66 which has been promoted by former FEC 
Chairman Trevor Potter, Professor Larry Lessig, and others,67 provides 
the following coordination approach: 
PROVISION 7: REVISE THE FEC’S COORDINATION 
REGULATIONS 
The FEC’s current coordination regulations, located at 11 C.F.R. § 
109.21, permit extensive collaboration between candidates and 
supposedly “independent” Super PACs. 
Amend the Federal Election Campaign Act, by adding at § 
431(17)(C), the following: 
In order for an expenditure to be considered an independent 
expenditure, the organization paying for the expenditure must act 
totally independently of any candidate or political party. This 
includes, but is not limited to, requirements that the person making 
the expenditure may not employ or retain any individual or accept 
any assistance, including the solicitation of funds, from any 
 
 65.  Federal law defines “contributions” to include “expenditures made by any person in 
cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate.” 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, 2 U.S.C.A. § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i) (West 2014); see also Shays v. 
FEC, 528 F.3d 914, 919–20 (D.C. Cir. 2008); 11 C.F.R. § 109.21; Smith, supra note 13, at 607–08. 
 66.  See AMERICAN ANTI-CORRUPTION ACT, anticorruptionact.org (last visited Jan. 19, 
2014). The text of the Act is posted at https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.unitedrepublic.org/docs/ 
AACA_Full_Provisions.pdf.  
 67.  Richard Painter, Lawrence Lessig, Trevor Potter, Theodore Roosevelt IV, Josh Silver et 
al. Push for Sweeping Anti-Corruption Legislation, LEGAL ETHICS FORUM (Nov. 14, 2012), 
http://www.legalethicsforum.com/blog/2012/11/lawrence-lessig-trevor-potter-theodore-roosevelt 
-iv-josh-silver-et-al-push-for-sweeping-anti-corrupt.html.  
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individual who is the candidate benefited by such expenditure, or 
who has, with respect to the candidate benefited by such 
expenditure, within the last 5 years (1) raised funds for the 
candidate; (2) been employed or retained by the candidate or 
candidate’s campaign(s) or the congressional office or committee 
staff of a Member of Congress or the Executive office of the 
President; (3) been employed or retained by a national political 
party committee of the political party of the candidate; (4) been 
employed or retained by a vendor employed or retained by the 
candidate, candidate’s campaign(s), or candidate’s party committee 
of that candidate to act in a fundraising, polling, media consultant, 
or campaign management capacity; or is (5) a spouse, partner, or 
relative of the candidate (father, mother, sister, brother, child, first 
cousin, aunt, uncle) (6) a current or former business partner or 
colleague of the candidate or of an employee of the candidate’s 
campaign. Additionally, if a candidate publicly or privately 
endorses or approves of an organization’s expenditure benefiting 
that candidate or any of the organization’s activities, then the 
expenditures of such organization shall be deemed coordinated 
with such candidate. 
Professor Richard Briffault offers a coordination proposal that 
addresses regulation of reliable Super PACs: 
I propose that for any organization that (i) focuses all of its 
electioneering expenditures on one or a very small number of 
candidates, and (ii) either is staffed by individuals who used to 
work for the candidate, the candidate’s campaign committee, or a 
political party in the current or past election cycle; has received 
fundraising support from a candidate, the candidate’s campaign, or 
staff; or has been publicly endorsed by the candidate as a vehicle 
for supporting that candidate, that organization is to be treated as 
a coordinated organization with that candidate or candidates, and 
its spending treated as coordinated spending with that of the 
candidate or candidates it supports.68 
The AACA and the Briffault proposals, however, reach much 
more broadly than actual coordination. For example, the AACA 
targets Super PACs that employ anyone who is politically active or 
any relative, former colleague, or former donor of a candidate. The 
AACA would effectively bar Super PACs from employing anyone 
who has worked for any member of Congress (not just the supported 
 
 68.  See Richard Briffault, Coordination Reconsidered, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 88, 
97 (2013), available at http://www.columbialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Briffault-
113-Colum.-L.-Rev.-88-2013.pdf.  
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candidate) for the last five years. This definition has nothing to do 
with coordination and is instead simply a way to put single-candidate 
(and many other) Super PACs out of business. Briffault’s proposal 
targets those individuals who had a close relationship with the 
candidate before forming the Super PAC. 
Supporters of the AACA might defend the broad coordination 
standard as a prophylactic means to prevent those with close personal 
relationships to a candidate from using those connections to 
surreptitiously coordinate on strategy. But actual coordination is 
unnecessary to achieve the aims of supporting a candidate and there 
is no need for those with a personal relationship to a candidate to risk 
a felony. The information that a Super PAC needs to be an effective 
proxy for a campaign is all public, and nothing depends on the 
personal relationship. As election lawyer Bob Bauer notes, “why do 
[candidates and Super PAC employees] have to have known each 
other when they can read websites and tweets?”69 
Briffault’s proposal is narrower than the AACA’s proposal, and 
much more defensible than the AACA’s blunderbuss approach. 
Further, there is no question Briffault is right that a single-candidate 
Super PAC will share a common purpose with a candidate’s campaign. 
He explains the basis for his proposal: 
The thrust of the first factor is that if a committee is devoting all of 
its election spending to promoting a specific candidate—whether 
with affirmative ads or attacks on that candidate’s opponent—then 
donations to that committee are effectively donations to the 
candidate. If an organization is involved in multiple election 
contests, then donations to the organization cannot be said to go to 
the aid of a specific candidate. In that case, although the 
organization’s spending may benefit certain candidates, the link 
between a particular donor and a particular candidate is 
attenuated. But where the organization is a single-candidate 
committee, the connection between donor and ultimate 
beneficiary is much stronger, and the donation begins to resemble 
Buckley’s “disguised contribution.” . . . 
The second factor addresses the concern that it is possible for a 
committee to be formed by a truly independent group of 
concerned citizens to advance just one candidate, but also to stress 
 
 69.  Robert F. Bauer, Professor Briffault on Super PACs and the Question of 
“Coordination”, MORE SOFT MONEY HARD LAW (May 8, 2013), 
http://www.moresoftmoneyhardlaw.com/2013/05/professor-briffault-on-super-pacs-and-the-ques 
tion-of-coordination/.  
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particular issues, concerns, or campaign themes that differ from 
those of the supported candidate. Even though focused solely on a 
single candidate in a specific election, such a group might still fit 
the model the Supreme Court sought to protect in Buckley. But 
the involvement in the committee of individuals with recent ties to 
the candidate or the endorsement of the committee’s work by the 
candidate or his staff indicates that the committee is very likely to 
act consistently with the preferred strategies, tactics, messages, and 
themes of the candidate and to act as an alter ego for the 
candidate’s official campaign even without the explicit interactions 
that the law currently looks for.70 
Briffault’s analysis, however, apparently conflates coordination 
with common purpose. As Professor Bradley Smith persuasively 
argues, Buckley’s understanding of coordination focuses on 
coordination of campaign strategy, and not simply the closeness of the 
prior or current relationship among different individuals or groups.71 
A rule that would equate common goals and common histories with 
coordination of campaign strategy would go well beyond the goal of 
barring disguised contributions. In other words, to show coordination, 
it is not enough to prove that the Super PAC acts “consistently” with 
the candidate’s views or even “as an alter ego”; coordination requires 
 
 70.  Briffault, supra note 68, at 97–99.  Briffault continues: 
The ties that indicate that a committee is not truly independent of a candidate would 
include having staff who recently worked for the candidate, either on her campaign or 
in her government office; who recently worked for a committee of that candidate’s 
party; who raised funds for a current or recent campaign of that candidate; or who 
recently worked for a vendor who provides campaign services to the candidate. A 
committee that exists solely to promote one or a very small number of candidates and 
is organized and operated by individuals with recent strong political ties to that 
candidate or candidates is very likely to be viewed by the candidate or candidates 
aided as providing integral support to their campaigns even in the absence of express 
current interaction between the independent committee and the candidate. Under 
those circumstances, it would be fair to say that donations to that committee should be 
treated as disguised contributions to the candidate. 
 
Similarly, even without the use of overlapping staff, if the candidate or his committee 
endorses or approves of an organization’s campaign activities on his behalf, calls on 
donors to give to that committee, participates in fundraising activities for it, or 
otherwise signals support for the organization’s campaign work, that, too, indicates 
that the candidate considers the committee to be a part of his campaign. Even in the 
absence of substantive discussions about campaign strategy, involvement in decisions 
about advertising messages, or transmission of inside information, the candidate’s 
endorsement of the organization’s work indicates that the candidate and committee 
are acting in concert to promote the candidate’s election. 
Id. 
 71.  Smith, supra note 14, at 630–35. 
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proof of “the explicit interactions that the law currently looks for.”72 A 
coordination rule that does not require explicit interactions appears 
to violate the First Amendment.73 
Briffault is on stronger grounds when he argues for a rule that 
treats candidates who urge donors to give to the Super PAC as 
coordinating with that Super PAC. A candidate who raises funds for a 
group by definition is coordinating fundraising strategy with that 
group; the candidate is taking time to raise funds for the group rather 
than for his campaign. Even Smith seems to agree that treating this 
activity as coordination would be constitutional under existing 
doctrine, at least when it involves a candidate soliciting funds for a 
single-candidate Super PAC.74 That fundraising lets would-be donors 
and the world know that a donation to the Super PAC is just as good 
(or better, given the lack of contribution limits) as a donation to the 
candidate’s campaign. After all, Mitt Romney was probably a lot 
happier with Sheldon Adelson’s $30 million contribution to Restore 
Our Future than he would have been with $5200 from Adelson to his 
campaign committee. 
And it is no doubt true that Super PACs with close personal or 
personnel ties to the candidate can create a public perception of 
undue influence over that candidate. Briffault is surely right that 
committees that exist solely to support specific candidates and are 
“either . . . organized and directed by individuals with close political 
ties to the candidate or . . . recognized as a supporter by the 
candidate . . . pose the same dangers of corruption and the appearance 
of corruption as donations to the candidate’s official campaign 
committee.”75 Indeed, I would argue that reliable Super PACs create 
nearly the identical actual undue influence problem that arises when a 
donor makes a large campaign contribution directly to a candidate. 
But, as we have seen, this idea of creating undue influence through 
 
 72.  Briffault, supra note 68, at 98. 
 73.  Smith, supra note 14, at 630–35. 
 74.  See id. at 635; see also Bauer, supra note 69 (arguing that fundraising alone does not 
allow for treating activity as coordinated). As Bradley Smith has noted: 
[T]his type of event, when the soliciting candidate knows that funds raised will be 
spent on behalf of his election, probably falls within the constitutional scope of 
‘coordination.’ In this case, it is not so much the solicitation per se but the appearance 
of the candidate at the event, and the fact that it is known that the PACs sole purpose 
is to elect this single candidate. 
Bradley A. Smith, Solicitation and Coordination, CTR. FOR COMPETITIVE POLITICS (Feb. 13, 
2014), http://www.campaignfreedom.org/2014/02/13/solicitation-and-coordination/. 
 75.  Briffault, supra note 68, at 99. 
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outside groups is in tension with the crabbed definition of corruption 
and the appearance of corruption under Citizens United and 
McCutcheon. Indeed, the problem may be deeper than Citizens 
United, and go instead to Buckley’s understanding of the non-
corruptive nature of independent spending.76 Regardless, undue 
influence, as bad as it may be, is not coordination. They are 
analytically distinct concepts. 
CONCLUSION 
The doctrinal move to an expanded definition of coordination to 
deal with the problem of Super PACs is completely understandable. 
But under current doctrine, courts would likely reject a broad 
coordination rule as infringing on the First Amendment rights of 
those involved with independent Super PACs. 
Instead, coordination is the sideshow and the fight over the 
meaning of corruption is the main event. Reformers must convince 
the Supreme Court to return to the broader definition of corruption 
(or accept some version of the political equality rationale), which 
would permit arguments in favor of not just the prevention of bribery 
but also the prevention of undue influence. That day may not come 
until the Supreme Court personnel changes, but it is the linchpin for 
the successful resuscitation of meaningful campaign finance 
regulation in the United States. 
 
 
 76.  See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976). As Buckley explains: 
Unlike contributions, such independent expenditures may well provide little 
assistance to the candidate’s campaign, and indeed may prove counterproductive. The 
absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or 
his agent not only undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, but also 
alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper 
commitments from the candidate. 
Id. 
